

NTSB National Transportation Safety Board

Collaboration

to Improve

Runway Safety


Presentation to: CAST

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
Date: June 7, 2012

Runway Accidents, 1995-2010

All Runway Accidents




Fatal Runway Accidents



Note: Of 1429 accidents involving major or substantial damage from 1995-2008, 431 (30%) were runway related

Runway Accident Fatalities, 1995-2010




Runway Incursions

- Previously defined by FAA as hazard created by airplane or vehicle on the runway when it should not have been
- Now generally defined as airplane or vehicle on the runway when it should not have been, whether or not hazard was created




Types of Runway Incursions



FY 2006-2011


Source: FAA

Runway Incursion Pilot Deviations by Type of Operation



Source: FAA

Category A&B Runway Incursions



Airport Operations (millions)

Source: FAA



NTSB Recommendations

- Immediate Collision/Incursion Warning in the Cockpit
- Specific Clearance for Each Runway Crossing (Closed Acceptable)
- Cockpit Moving Map Displays to Alert re Wrong Runway



The Challenge

- Tenerife runway incursion accident resulted in more fatalities (583) than any accident in aviation history
- Many more airplanes, very few new runways
- Inadequate understanding of "Why"
- Runway incursions reflect system problems that demand system solutions

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Current Process

- ATC identifies type of problem
- Handling of problem depends largely on ATC's identification of who made the last "mistake"
- If ATC says ATC made last mistake: handled by ATC
- If ATC says pilot made last mistake: handled by FAA Flight Standards



Result

- Selection bias
- Process was created to identify whom to punish, rather than to identify and remedy problems in the system
- Each person says it was other person's fault, cannot get complete picture from one person
- Does not result in system solutions for system problems

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Suggested Solution: Collaboration

- Precedent: Altitude busts, early 1990's
- Altitude bust rate stubbornly resisted improvement, despite vigorous enforcement
- John Kern proposed collaborative approach
- Result: Rate decreased substantially
- CAST has demonstrated how successful collaboration can be to improve aviation safety



Collaboration for Runway Safety?

- Process should not depend upon who made last mistake
- Bring all involved parties (pilots, controllers, vehicle drivers) together, find out what happened
- No enforcement action (absent criminal or intentional wrongdoing)
- Ascertain totality of circumstances

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Starting Out

- Try limited number as beta tests
- Start with trouble spot locations
- Beta test lesser events, that NTSB will not investigate
- Beta test systemic issues, not just "Joe had a bad day"
- Determine from beta test experience whether to continue and expand process



Runway Excursions


- Includes takeoff overruns, landing overruns, and departing the runway laterally during takeoff or landing
- Does not include landing short
- Almost 60 times more excursion accidents than incursion accidents
- Almost 11 times more fatal accidents, and almost 9 times more fatalities, from excursions than incursions

NTSB 😰


Runway Excursions

Total Excursions 21% Takeoff Landing

Takeoff Excursions



Landing Excursions



Collaborative Process?

- Worth considering
- Not as likely to be helpful



Runway Confusions

 Includes using other than dedicated or assigned surface for takeoff or landing, e.g., taxiway other than runway, or wrong runway

Less than 1% of runway related accidents



Collaborative Process?

- May be as helpful as with incursions
- Not as many opportunities



Conclusion

- CAST has demonstrated how successful effective collaboration can be
- NTSB relies heavily upon collaboration in accident investigations
- Collaboration can also help aviation community address runway incursions, confusions, and possibly also excursions



Thank You!!!



Questions?

